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Could Present Laws Legitimately Bind Future Generations? 
A Normative Analysis of the Jeffersonian Model
by Shai Agmon
A bstract: Thomas Jefferson ’s fam ou s 
/  I  proposal, whereby a state’s constitu- 
JL  J L  tion shou ld  be re-ena cted  every 19 
years by a majority vote, purports to solve the 
in tergen era tiona lp rob lem  caused by p erp etu ­
a l constitutions: nam ely that laws wh ich  w ere 
en a cted  by p eop le w ho are already d ea d  b ind  
liv in g  citizens w ith ou t th eir consent. I  argue 
tha t the m od el fa i ls  to fu l f i l  its own norm ative 
consent-based aspirations. This is because it 
produ ces tw o groups o f  p eop le w ho w ill en d
up liv in g  under laws to w h ich  they d id  not 
g iv e  their consent: (a) citizens who reach the 
vo tin g  a ge a fter the re-enactm en t process; (b) 
citizens who d id  n o t assent to b ein g ob liged  
by the m ajority vo te’s results. I  re ject possible 
responses to my a rgum ent by show in g that they 
result in making the m od e l eith er im practica l 
or redundant. The rem ainder o f  the pap er dis­
cusses wheth er im p lem en tin g the m od el w ou ld  
enhance the consent-based legitim acy o f  the 
m odern state.
Introduction1
It is commonly believed that the legitima­
cy of political authority is founded on the 
consent of the governed to be bound by it. 
However, for those who take this stance, 
the transition between generations presents 
an intergenerational challenge: why should 
laws which were enacted by people who are 
now dead bind those presently alive? What 
about their consent?2 Thomas Jefferson 
most famously raised this question in his
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letter to James Madison from September 
1789. His answer was that “‘the dead have 
neither powers nor rights” over the living, 
and thus “no society can make a perpetu­
al constitution.”3 Thomas Paine, who sid­
ed with Jefferson on this issue at the time, 
similarly claimed that “every age and gen­
eration must be as free to act for itself in 
all cases as the ages and generations which 
preceded it.”4
For laws to have legitimate authority over 
future generations, Jefferson suggested 
the following institutional design: all laws 
would be re-enacted every 19 years by a 
majority vote of the living, and laws not 
re-enacted would lapse.5 Such a mecha­
nism is supposed to obtain the consent of 
every new generation to the state’s laws, and 
thereby provide a solution to the intergen­
erational challenge; only the living will gov­
ern the living7.
Although intuitively compelling, in this 
paper, by engaging with the contempo­
rary discussion regarding modern states 
that followed Jefferson’s proposal, I argue 
that Jefferson’s institutional design in par­
ticular, and thus the idea of reaffirming 
the constitution at fixed intervals by every 
new generation in general, fails to fulfil its 
own normative aspiration of ensuring the 
legitimacy of the state based on the consent 
of its living citizens.7 That is because it 
necessarily results in two groups of people 
(on a significant scale) living under laws 
to which they did not give their consent. 
Moreover, I argue that in order to fulfil 
its normative aspirations, there must be 
changes made either to the design, or to 
the type of consent on which it is based. 
Such changes, I argue, would either render 
the model’s implementation unrealistic and 
undesirable, or make it redundant.8 This is 
not to say that the idea of reaffirming the 
constitution every generation is not desir­
able for other reasons. My argument refers 
only to the implausibility of the aspiration 
of legitimising the state by the consent of its 
citizens by using Jefferson’s mechanism (or 
similar mechanisms).
After reaching this conclusion, I discuss 
whether implementing Jefferson’s model, 
despite its defects, would still be an im­
provement over the status quo. Putting it 
differently, I discuss whether Jefferson’s 
model would make modern democracies 
“more legitimate”. I conclude that the Jef­
fersonian model is either not an improve­
ment over the status quo, or not the best 
improvement available.
I argue that Jefferson's institutional 
design in particular, and thus the 
idea of reaffirming the constitution 
at fixed intervals by every new 
generation in general, fails to fulfil 
its own normative aspiration [...].
The paper is structured as follows. First, I 
present the “lost-generation” objection, ac­
cording to which, even after implementing 
Jefferson’s model, those who reached the 
voting age after the re-enactment would 
necessarily be unable to express their con­
sent to past laws for a significant period 
of time. Second, I present the “majority 
consent” objection, namely that a majori­
ty-vote-based solution fails to ensure the le­
gitimacy of past laws, since voters might not 
grant their consent for the vote itself (either 
by voting instrumentally or by not voting 
at all). Third, by exploring the option of 
“partial legitimacy”, I discuss whether im­
plementing Jefferson’s institutional design 
would be an improvement over the status 
quo with regards to the legitimacy of mod­
ern states. Lastly, I conclude and discuss the 
practical implications of my analysis.
The “lost generation” objection
Suppose that a constitution is legitimately 
authorised by means of a majority vote by 
generation X at t0. t1 is the point in time 19 
years later, when the majority of generation 
X has died, and the next generation -  gen­
eration Z -  participates in the re-enactment 
process. The problem is that all of the citi­
zens who reach voting age between t0 and 
t1 -  call them generation Y -  would have to 
wait up to 19 years until they can express 
their consent to the laws in the reenactment 
process. Generation Y is thus a “lost gener­
ation” (see illustration).
Hence the objection: Jefferson’s account 
fails to provide generation Y with the option 
to approve the state’s laws for a significant 
period. Until generation Y votes with gen­
eration Z, instead of being governed by the 
dead, they would -  on Jefferson’s account
-  be governed by generation X, and would 
not be self-governing.
Such a problem, as acknowledged by Otsuka,
stems, at least partially, from narrow con­
sent-based views, which base the legitimacy 
of political authority solely on freely ex­
pressed consent.9 Hence, it might be plau­
sible to overcome it by allowing a broader 
scope of types of consent as the normative 
basis of legitimate political authority, name­
ly to include ta cit o r  h ypoth etica l consent. In 
this section, I scrutinise both options and 
argue that neither a tacit-consent-based 
view nor a hypothetical-consent-based view 
could salvage Jefferson’s proposal from the 
lost generation problem. In the last part of 
this section, I explore a different solution 
to the lost generation problem -  shorten­
ing the length of the intervals between each 
vote -  and argue that such a solution ren­
ders the implementation of the Jeffersonian 
model impractical and undesirable.
Tacit consent solution
Otsuka proposes overcoming the lost 
generation problem by the realisation 
of a Lockean ideal of free and equal tacit 
consent.10 In order to legitimise political 
authority, actual consent need not necessar­
ily be expressed, but could also be inferred 
from action.11 For example, Locke argued 
that tacit consent to political authority can 
be inferred from residence within a state’s 
territories, owning a land in a state, or 
enjoying benefits from the government.12
Jefferson's account fails to provide 
generation Y with the option 
to approve the state's laws for a 
significant period.
As Otsuka rightly notes, Locke’s account 
makes subjection to political authority hard 
to avoid.13 There are citizens who lack the 
economic means to move abroad. Others 
are bereft of the necessary cultural back­
ground or reasonable alternative political 
authorities to choose from. Their inaction 
must not be regarded as tacit consent. Peo­
ple, therefore, can reside in a certain state, 
own property or make use of the govern­
ment’s services, without consenting to it.14 
Had they had the opportunity -  so they 
could claim -  they would not have given 
their consent. Thus, in certain circumstanc­
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es, inferring tacit consent could lead to a 
situation in which people who do not free­
ly consent to being governed by a certain 
political authority are considered to have so 
consented.15 In reality, most people do not 
give their consent, even tacitly, to a polit­
ical authority just by residing or owning a 
property within its territory. That is because 
most people do not choose their place of 
residence, and cannot move elsewhere even 
if they wanted to, due to a lack of means or 
opportunity.16
To avoid this problem, Otsuka adds three 
provisos that must be fulfilled in a certain 
political association in order to infer tacit 
consent of its members to its laws:
a) Egalitarian proviso : there must be an 
egalitarian distribution of worldly resourc­
es, so that everyone has the means to move 
from one political association to another.
b) Pluralistic proviso : there should be suffi­
cient decentralisation and pluralisation of 
political societies, so that everyone has al­
ternative political authorities from which to 
choose.
c) In ternationa l order proviso : the relations 
between the political societies must be regu­
lated by an inter-political government body, 
which is “charged to oversee the drawing of 
boundaries between the societies, settle dis­
putes and govern the disposition of posses­
sions of worldly resources to ensure that it 
is in accordance with the egalitarian provi- 
so.”17
Under such circumstances, free and actual 
tacit consent could be inferred from res­
idence, owning property or other actions, 
since everyone is free and able to live under 
a sufficient number of different political au­
thorities.18
Assuming that Otsuka’s reconstruction of 
Locke’s tacit-consent-based view is indeed 
valid, and that only in such an ideal society 
one can infer tacit consent from residence, 
we are able to identify two plausible impli­
cations regarding Jefferson’s institutional 
design:
i. Id ea l w orld  scenario: In Otsuka’s ideal 
world, after the death of the majority of 
generation X, we can infer tacit consent by 
residence of both generation Y and Z, since 
everyone would have sufficient alternative 
options to live in, as well as the resources 
to move between political societies. In such 
a world, the Jeffersonian model would be 
rendered superfluous: we do not need the 
re-enactment process in order to provide 
people with the opportunity to express their
consent, since we can infer tacit consent 
from residence.19
ii. R eal w orld  scenario: In the modern real 
world, Otsuka’s conditions are clearly not 
met.20 Thus, we cannot infer tacit consent 
from residence.21 As such, we are left with 
the lost generation problem — we cannot 
i nfer generation Y’s consent only by virtue 
of its members living in a certain country.22
These implications of Otsuka’s tacit-con­
sent-based approach show that tacit con­
sent is not a viable option for vindicating 
Jefferson’s account from the lost generation 
objection regarding real-world modern 
states.23 However, since Otsuka is focused 
only on inferring tacit consent from res­
idence, there is a third option that needs 
to be considered — a real world scenario in 
which there is indeed a way to infer tacit 
consent. I cannot think of an example of 
such an option. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that if there were a way to in­
fer tacit consent without Otsukian ideal 
background conditions, then we could le­
gitimise political authorities in such a way 
for all people, not just the lost generation, 
and without needing the Jeffersonian mod- 
el.24 Therefore, in all three possible worlds
— (1) ideal world; (2) non-ideal world with 
an option for inferring tacit consent; (3) 
non-ideal world without an option for in­
ferring tacit consent — tacit consent is either 
not an option or makes the Jeffersonian 
model redundant.
In reality, most people do not give 
their consent, even tacitly, to a 
political authority just by residing or 
owning a property within its territory.
Hence, assuming that in the real world tac­
it consent is, at least at the moment, not 
an option, there is a need for institutional 
designs that are based solely on express or 
hypoth etica l consent. Jefferson tried to do 
the former, but failed to solve the “lost gen­
eration” problem. In what follows, I discuss 
the latter.
H ypothetical consen t solution  
Both express-consent-based views and 
t acit-consent-based views purport to base 
the legitimacy of political authority on the 
actual consent of the governed.25 If, for 
example, someone explicitly says that she 
does not give her consent to be governed 
by political authority X, then according 
to both views, she cannot be legitimate­
ly governed by X. The shift from express 
consent to tacit consent is necessary since 
getting the unequivocal express consent of 
all citizens is very hard (as the lost genera­
tion problem clearly shows), and tacit con­
sent is instrumentally a more viable option 
for consent-based views.26 Hypothetical- 
consent-based views do not purport to 
base the legitimacy of the state on the ac­
tual consent of the governed for all sorts 
of reasons. The governed might be wrong 
and give their consent to illegitimate po­
litical regimes; they might reject perfectly 
legitimate regimes and so on. By contrast, 
such views base the legitimacy of the state 
on hypothetical consent — namely on the 
consent that one would hypothetically give 
if one were rational, reasonable, or meet 
any other normative criterion. In Muniz- 
Fraticelli’s words, hypothetical consent is 
“the normative supposition that an indivi­
dual, if reasonable, ought to consent to a 
certain arrangement because of certain mor­
ally salient characteristics of the choice situa- 
tion.”27 The normative focus of such views 
is the moral characteristics of the political 
authority and whether one should consent 
to it or not, rather than the actual consent 
itself.28
Therefore, according to such views, a plausi­
ble response to the lost generation problem 
would be that if a reasonable person would 
agree to be governed by the Jeffersonian 
state, then the lost generation could be 
considered a generation that hypothetically 
consents to be governed. However, as the 
tacit consent response, this response fails to 
explain why the Jeffersonian mechanism is 
necessary at all. We could justify the state’s 
legitimacy for all generations according to 
a hypothetical consent criterion, without 
the need for reaffirming the constitution 
at fixed intervals, and thus the Jeffersonian 
model is, once again, redundant.
In sum, changing the type of consent from 
express consent to tacit or hypothetical 
consent in order to respond to the lost 
generation objection either is impractical 
(in non-ideal worlds where tacit consent 
cannot be inferred), or would make the 
Jeffersonian model superfluous.
A d ifferen t solution: Shortening the intervals 
There is a different plausible response on 
behalf of Jefferson to the “lost generation” 
objection. One could argue that it is true 
that the fact that a whole generation will 
not be able to give its consent to past laws is 
normatively repugnant. However, one may
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add, shortening the length of the intervals 
between re-enactments could make the 
mechanism more plausible. Instead of 19 
years, for instance, the re-enactment process 
could take place every four years. Living for 
four years in a democratic state under laws 
that you did not personally approve seems 
intuitively better, albeit problematic, com­
pared to 19 years. If the regime is other­
wise legitimate, and the cost is four years of 
waiting for the opportunity to participate 
in the re-enactment process, it seems like 
a much more negligible cost, which might 
not undermine the normative appeal of the 
Jeffersonian model as a whole (remember 
that for the non-lost generations the model 
is extremely appealing).
As the tacit consent response,
[the hypothetical-consent view] 
fails to explain why the Jeffersonian 
mechanism is necessary at all.
However, the problem of this response 
is that as the number of years between 
re-enactments decreases, the plausibility 
and desirability of implementing such in­
stitutional design decreases accordingly. 
Muniz-Fraticelli argued against Jefferson’s 
proposal that its practical implications are 
undesirable.29 That is to say, that re-enacting 
the constitution every 19 years will result in 
social instability; it would be impossible to 
initiate long-term projects, even when the 
benefits are extremely large; the political 
turmoil before each re-enactment will result 
in fear of anarchy that in turn will ignite 
aggressive, perhaps even violent, politi­
cal struggles. Conversely, Otsuka claimed 
that this kind of pessimistic forecast is too 
hasty.30 He defended the practicality of 
Jefferson’s proposal on the assumption that 
a majority vote every 19 years would prob­
ably not jeopardise the country’s stability, 
and will not lead to disastrous consequenc­
es and anarchy. In support of his claim, 
Otsuka points out that even today a num­
ber of legislatures around the world possess 
the power to change the constitution by a 
simple majority vote (e.g. Israel or Britain), 
and yet, they refrain from doing so; most 
laws endure and major reforms do not take 
place too often.31 That is because “there are 
strong informal barriers that stand in the 
way of frequent and destabilising repeal 
of laws by majority vote.”32 According to 
Otsuka, there would probably be a bias in 
favour of the status quo, and thus the norm 
would be that only minor changes could be 
made during each re-enactment. Therefore
it would be plausible to initiate long-term 
projects, and the polity would not suffer 
from exceptional instability.
I do not wish to determine which prediction 
is more accurate. Nonetheless, it seems rea­
sonable to claim that the shorter the period 
between re-enactments, the more plausible 
Muniz-Fraticelli’s prediction becomes. This 
is due to the costs of the process; the uncer­
tainty as to the basic structure of the polit­
ical society; and the frequent extreme po­
litical battles. All of these would take place 
more frequently, and thus political turmoil, 
as foreseen by Muniz-Fraticelli, would be­
come more probable. Adding these costs of 
probable instability to the already norma­
tively defective system decreases the desira­
bility of the Jeffersonian model.33 
It should be noted that the fact that Jeffer­
son’s proposal is impractical and politically 
destabilising does not render current stable, 
perpetual-constitution-based modern states 
legitimate. However, such fact could justify 
their existence w ith ou t Jefferson ’s m odel, as a 
matter of necessity to preserve stability and 
refrain from anarchy (assuming that anar­
chy is undesirable). As Otsuka accepts, our 
right not to be governed by others “is not 
an absolute right, as there are circumstances 
in which it would be unreasonable to in­
sist on its non-infringement.”34 Assuming 
Muniz-Fraticelli’s predictions are correct 
regarding the modified version, states with 
perpetual constitutions guarantee stability, 
while the implementation of the Jeffer­
sonian model could lead to anarchy and 
catastrophe. Considering such a trade-off, 
it is justified and reasonable to infringe 
people’s rights for giving their consent to 
be governed. Thus, it is justified to govern 
people without their consent for the sake of 
stability, even though the state is still ille­
gitimate from a consent-based view per- 
spective.35
It should be noted that the fact 
that Jefferson’s proposal is impractical 
and politically destabilising does 
not render current stable, perpetual- 
constitution-based modern states 
legitimate.
To recap, Jefferson’s model fails to legitimise 
modern states for all of their citizens due 
to the “lost generation” objection. Other 
types of consent are either impractical or 
make the model redundant. The model’s 
improved version is objectionable due to 
its probable undesirable results. Thus, the 
model and its improvement fails to fulfil
its normative aspiration to serve as an in­
stitutional design for legitimising the state 
on the basis of the consent of the governed.
The “majority consent” objection
So far, I have assumed that the re-enactment 
process by majority vote ensures the legi­
timacy of the re-enacted laws regarding 
those who participate in the process. In 
this section I scrutinise this assumption. A 
consent-based theory of legitimate political 
authority requires each in d iv idua l to per­
sonally consent to the authority by which 
she is bound.36 Thus, it is not enough, as 
Jefferson assumes, to conduct a majori­
ty vote in order to legitimise laws; a prior 
requirement has to be met. Every individual 
of the new generation needs first to grant 
her consent to be bound by the results of 
the majority vote itself. Only then would 
the majority vote have the normative force 
to bind every participant. Without such 
prior unanimous consent, each individual 
who does not consent to be bound by the 
results of the majority vote would be ille­
gitimately governed. Therefore, to be able 
to legitimise the political authority of the 
state, Jefferson’s mechanism should include 
a way to ensure that all citizens would unan­
imously give their consent to be obliged by 
the majority vote itself. If, as it turns out, 
Jefferson’s mechanism cannot meet such a 
requirement while remaining practically 
feasible, then the objection — namely that 
those who do not consent to be obliged to 
the majority vote results would be illegiti­
mately governed by the state’s laws — would 
hold.
Jefferson could respond to the above-men­
tioned objection in the following three 
ways:
The “fa lse  in terpretation” response 
One could argue that Jefferson, and anyone 
who supports reaffirming the constitution 
at fixed intervals by every new generation, 
is not committed to consent-based theory, 
but rather to some kind of democratic- 
based justification of authority, by which 
democracy has intrinsic value, or that de­
mocracy is the best institutional design for 
collective decision-making.37 Therefore the 
majority vote is the normative basis for the 
state’s legitimacy, and not the direct consent 
of each and every one of its citizens, and 
this is the reason for re-enacting the consti­
tution every generation. This is not a direct 
response to the “majority consent” objec­
tion, but rather a claim that undermines
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the whole idea that the Jeffersonian model 
relies on a consent-based view of political 
legitimacy.38 However, such a claim cannot 
explain the intergenerational concern that 
underlies the Jeffersonian model. If the 
laws of the old constitute a democracy, why 
would Jefferson insist on re-enactment? If 
the democratic institutions and procedures 
make a state legitimate, then it seems there 
is no need to re-legitimise what is already 
a democracy (assuming that generation X 
established a democracy). Moreover, specif­
ically regarding Jefferson, he was explicitly 
trying to defend individuals’ consent by 
arguing that “the rights of the whole can 
be no more than the sum of the rights of 
the individuals.”39 He does not mention 
democracy, but rather refers to the control 
of each and every individual over her own 
life. Thus, the proper and only plaus ible 
interpretation of the underlying normative 
motivation of the Jeffersonian model is con­
sent-based. Therefore this response fails.
If the democratic institutions and 
procedures make a state legitimate, 
then it seems there is no need to 
re-legitimise what is already a 
democracy.
The “tacit consen t by v o tin g” response 
Jefferson could respond by saying that the 
re-enactment process is a signal from which 
we can infer tacit consent; i.e. that by vot­
ing, one tacitly consents to be obliged by 
the vote’s results. This response does not 
render Jefferson’s account redundant (as the 
tacit-consent-based response to the “lost 
generation objection” did), since the re-en­
actment of laws every 19 years would still 
be needed. Albeit promising, this response 
fails as well. The following case illustrates 
the reasons for such failure:
Mohanad is a Palestinian who became an 
Israeli citizen after Jewish military forces40 
conquered his city in 1948, the year in 
which the State of Israel was established. 
Mohanad did not consent to be governed 
by Israelis (more specifically, by Israeli Jews). 
However, he wished to stay in his homeland 
and thus decided not to leave. Furthermore, 
even if he had wanted to leave the country, 
he did not have the means to do so. People 
like Mohanad, i.e. Palestinians with Israeli 
citizenship, have the right to vote. By vot­
ing, Mohanad increases the chances of the 
election of a representative who will pro­
mote his interests. Thus, he chooses to vote 
for instrumental reasons.
It cannot be inferred from Mohanad’s in­
strumental participation in the vote that 
he gave his consent to Israeli laws and Is­
raeli political authority. Similarly, in our 
non-ideal world, where most people cannot 
easily leave their countries, Jefferson cannot 
infer from participation in the re-enactment 
process that all participants have grant­
ed their consent. As Mohanad does, they 
could be voting in an instrumental manner, 
while not giving their consent to the politi­
cal authority they are under at the moment. 
Lacking Otsuka’s ideal provisions, which 
guarantee that people have the option to 
choose a different political authority, this 
response, which also relies on tacit consent, 
fails too. Moreover, it should be mentioned 
that even if it were plausible to infer tacit 
consent from voting, in order to legitimise 
the state on the basis of consent, there is a 
need for all individuals to give their consent 
without exceptions. Therefore a further as­
sumption has to be made, namely that there 
will be 100% turnout every 19 years, for we 
cannot infer consent from those who do 
not vote.41 Granting that such an assump­
tion is extremely unrealistic -  especially in 
the modern world -  it follows that even if 
we could infer tacit consent from voting, 
there would still be a group of people (the 
non-voters) who would be illegitimately 
governed.
The m od ified  m od el response 
Jefferson could accept the objection and 
amend his model by adding a requirement 
for unanimous consent of the governed to 
be bound by the majority vote. The prob­
lem with this amendment, as rightly argued 
by Simmons, is that “if unanimous consent 
is required for legitimacy, no government 
will be legitimate.”42 If every individual 
can undercut the legitimacy of the state, 
it would be virtually impossible to achieve 
unanimous consent in modern states, which 
consist of millions of people. This is indeed 
a problem shared by all consent-based the­
ories of legitimate authority.43 Neverthe­
less, it is especially troubling for Jefferson, 
for even if we can assume that unanimous 
consent could be reached once by the 
country’s founding generation, it would be 
highly implausible to expect that it could 
be reached every 19 years. Thus the mod­
ified account solves the problem, but it is 
extremely unlikely to result in a functioning 
state and would probably lead to anarchy. 
It is unreasonable to expect an unanimous 
consent of millions of people to a certain
political authority every 19 years.44 More­
over, as mentioned above, even if unanimous 
consent every 19 years were possible, there 
would also be a need for a 100% turnout 
every 19 years, in order to guarantee the 
consent of all people. Again, this is extreme­
ly unlikely to happen, a fact that makes this 
modified version of Jefferson’s model even 
more unrealistic. If Jefferson’s goal is actual­
ly, not theoretically, to ensure the legitimacy 
of the political authorities (which I believe 
it is), then this objection makes his model 
less compelling.
Should a Jeffersonian model be pursued 
despite its defects?
Up to this point, I have shown that if we 
were to implement Jefferson’s model, and 
assuming no other type of consent-based 
theory is feasible (hypothetical or tacit), two 
groups of people would not be obliged to 
obey the state’s laws:
(1) Generation Y (i.e. those who reached 
the voting age after the re-enactment of the 
new laws).
(2) People who vote and refuse to commit to 
the results of the majority vote reenactment 
process (that is assuming that everyone 
is voting; if some do not vote, then the 
non-voters are part of this second group).
Thus, if one still wishes to implement the 
Jeffersonian model, one has to decide be­
tween the following scenarios:
a) Partia l anarchy scenario: If one wish­
es to avoid illegitimately coercing people 
who did not give their consent to the laws 
(namely the two groups aforementioned), 
one would have to accept that those people, 
who live under the state’s territory, will not 
necessarily obey its laws. In such scenario, 
a “window of anarchy” would open in the 
country, since the rule of law would be un­
dermined.45
b) Coercive scenario: One could accept the 
unfortunate fact that the model is limited, 
but still decide that in order to prevent an­
archy and preserve the rule of law, there is a 
need to illegitimately force the people from 
these two groups to obey the state’s laws, 
even without their expressed consent to it.
Assuming that most non-anarchists would 
reject the former option,46 in the remainder 
of this paper I explore whether a Jefferson­
ian state as described in option (b) would 
be an improvement over current modern 
states, despite its defects.
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After defending Jefferson’s proposal, Otsu- 
ka states that he believes that “any actually 
existing democracy which adopted this pro­
posal would more fully realise the ideals of 
democracy and the popular sovereignty of 
the living over the living.”47 Such a claim is 
controversial, both within and outside the 
Otsukian framework. Within the Otsukian 
framework, a legitimate state would fulfil 
the three provisos mentioned above. Thus, 
implementing Jefferson’s mechanism 
should be considered an improvement if it 
would contribute to bringing modern states 
closer to such an ideal. Unfortunately, it is 
at least not clear if implementing the model 
would in fact bring modern state closer to 
the Otsukian ideals. The mere fact of con­
ducting a re-enactment process every 19 
years does not and cannot guarantee that 
the society would become more egalitarian, 
pluralistic, or that it would have any effect 
on international relations. On the contrary, 
as claimed by Muniz-Fraticelli, reenactment 
could lead to societies which are less equal 
and less stable.48 Hence, it follows that im­
plementing Jefferson’s model would not 
necessarily be an improvement over the 
status quo, at least with respect to getting 
closer to the Otsukian ideal.
Even if we can assume that unanimous 
consent could be reached once by 
the country’s founding generation, it 
would be highly implausible to expect 
that it could be reached every 19 years.
Having said that, I believe that Otsuka’s 
claim regarding Jefferson’s model being an 
improvement does not mean that the im­
plementation of the model would bring 
contemporary modern states closer to 
an ideal, but rather that it would bring 
about a different kind of improvement, 
namely an improvement that makes cur­
rent modern states “more legitimate” — al­
though, as Otsuka himself acknowledges, 
not completely legitimate, due to the two 
objections. The question is thus whether 
legitimacy is a binary or scalar quality. Put­
ting it in Simmons’s words, the question is 
whether the concept of partial legitimacy is 
intelligible in the context of consent-based 
theories of political legitimacy.49 
Consider the following two types of states 
and assume that each state consists of 100 
people. Also assume that both states are very 
similar to current western democracies, i.e. 
that most people enjoy relatively satisfacto­
ry material welfare and that the regime is
democratic and stable. In state A, there has 
never been a re-enactment process. Thus, 
none of state A’s citizens have given their 
consent to being governed by it. In state B, 
on the other hand, 50 people have consent­
ed to the state’s authority while the other 50 
have not. Is state B “more legitimate” than 
state A?
An intuitive answer would be: “Yes, more 
people gave their consent, so state B is more 
legitimate.” However, under scrutiny, this 
intuitive answer becomes questionable. The 
most salient principle underpinning con­
sent-based theories is that the legitimacy of 
political authority should be founded upon 
the consent of each and every individual. 
As Locke argued: “nothing but the consent 
of the individual can make anything to be 
the act of the whole.”50 Without the over­
arching consent of all the people who are 
governed by a certain political entity, it is 
not permissible for such an entity to force 
someone to obey its laws. According to such 
a strict rationale, the aggregation of individ­
uals who have consented should not make 
any difference; if the state infringes the right 
of one, then it is already illegitimate, and 
anarchy should be preferred over it, at least 
when focusing solely on the legitimacy of 
the state.51 Under such strict view, legitima­
cy is a binary concept and thus the meaning 
of the fact that aggregation does not matter 
is that both states are equally illegitimate. 
Hence, the Jeffersonian model cannot be 
considered an improvement over the status 
quo.52
One could respond that this is a counter-in­
tuitive view of rights, and that surely state B 
is more legitimate because its existence leads 
to fewer infringements of rights. Such a po­
sition would turn Lockean consent-based 
views of political legitimacy into “utilitar­
ianism of rights” consent-based views. A 
utilitarian of rights would claim that if we 
believe that all people have a right not to 
be governed by a political authority without 
their consent, then we need to strive for an 
institutional design that maximises the reali­
sation o f  this righ t a n d  m inim ises the num ber 
o f  in fringem ents.53 Thus, if  the best way to 
minimise the violation of right X in society 
is to actually infringe the rights of a small 
group within that society, then infringing 
the rights of the small group is justified. 
The best way to illustrate this point is to 
think about a case in which murdering one 
person would prevent the murder of five 
others. In such a scenario, according to the 
utilitarian of rights, killing the one is justi­
fied. Therefore, following such logic, Jeffer­
son’s mechanism is justifiable because even 
though it necessarily infringes both genera­
tion Y’s right and the right of those who do 
not consent to be obliged by the majority 
vote to not be illegitimately governed, it is 
the institutional mechanism that minimises 
the violation of such.
The mere fact of conducting a re­
enactment process every 19 years 
does not and cannot guarantee that 
the society would become more 
egalitarian, pluralistic, or that it would 
have any effect on international 
relations.
This response partially fails, because it does 
not take into account the possibility of an­
archy. If there is no institutional design that 
ensures that all people are able to express 
their consent to the political authority that 
governs them, the design that will maxim­
ise the realisation of the right to be legiti­
mately governed and that would minimise 
its violation, is no government at all. Thus 
a coherent utilitarianism of rights view 
would lead to the conclusion that anarchy 
is the best plausible solution — and not the 
Jeffersonian state. However, this response 
only partially fails. Although it is not the 
maximal improvement at hand, the Jeffer­
sonian model is still an improvement over 
the status quo.
To recap, I presented two different views 
about the right to not be governed without 
consent. The first is a strict view that sees 
a state as illegitimate if it violates even one 
individual’s right to be legitimately gov­
erned. According to such a view, both state 
A and state B are equally illegitimate, since 
the aggregation of people whose rights are 
not infringed does not normatively matter. 
Therefore both states should either find a 
mechanism to ensure the consent of all peo­
ple under their authority; or open a “win­
dow of anarchy” for the people who refuse 
to give their consent; or not exist at all. The 
second outlook, a utilitarianism of rights 
view, also leads to the conclusion that an­
archy would be better than implementing 
Jefferson’s model (in terms of consent-based 
legitimacy), but it does consider the Jeffer­
sonian model an improvement.54
Conclusion
I have argued that the underlying norma­
tive motivation of Jefferson’s account is 
to legitimise all laws using the consent of 
all living citizens. I have established that
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regarding real-world modern states, the 
original account of Jefferson fails to ensure 
that aspiration for two specific groups of 
people. I have also explored the question of 
whether a Jeffersonian state would be more 
legitimate than contemporary states, and 
argued that it would not be. Thus, a Jeffer­
sonian state might be compelling, but not 
for reasons of legitimacy grounded in con­
sent. The practical implications of such a 
normative analysis are of significance, since 
one of the underlying motivations of the 
intergenerational debates regarding perpet­
ual constitutions is exactly the motivation 
that drove Jefferson to propose his model: 
the fact that the living are being ruled by 
the dead without their consent. Hence, if 
one holds a consent-based view of political 
legitimacy, and one does not have other 
reasons to pursue periodic constitutional 
re-enactments, then ideas such as Jefferson’s 
should be off the table, and the intergener­
ational debate should focus on other solu­
tions or on different theories of legitimacy.55
Notes
1 I am grateful to Michael Otsuka, Matt 
Hitchens, Chris Otero and Yonatan Levi 
and the jurors of the Intergenerational 
Justice Prize 2015/2016 for reviewing this 
paper and providing me with valuable com­
ments.
2 I use the terms “laws” and “constitutions” 
interchangeably throughout the paper. By 
both terms I mean the set of political prin­
ciples whereby a state is governed, e.g. the 
design of political institutions, the separa­
tion of powers, the conventions underpin­
ning law making, the protection of human 
rights, etc. For the purpose of this paper, I 
do not make a distinction between written 
constitutions and constitutional statues 
(basic laws).
3 Jefferson 1984: 959-963.
4 Paine 2011: 74.
5 According to Jefferson’s (1984) calcula­
tion, 19 years was the time needed to pass 
for a generation’s majority to die. Otsuka 
(2003) amended this number to 20 years, 
according to current life expectancy.
6 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 380-382.
7 I wish to emphasise that there are other 
views concerning the basis of legitimacy of 
political authorities. If one does not accept 
consent-based theories to begin with, one 
should not be concerned with my argument 
or with the Jeffersonian model.
8 My argument is irrelevant to the question 
of whether Jefferson’s model, as described
by him, is practical or not. This question 
has been discussed both by Otsuka and by 
Muniz-Fraticelli. While Otsuka argued that 
Jefferson’s mechanism could be practically 
implemented without colossal costs, 
Muniz-Fraticelli claimed that such a mech­
anism would result in economic and social 
instability, which makes Jefferson’s propos­
al undesirable. My argument is different: I 
contend that Jefferson’s mechanism fails to 
fulfil its own normative aspirations. In order 
to fulfil them, as I show later on, Jefferson 
would be required to make amendments 
to his model; and these changes, in turn, 
make the mechanism both impractical and 
undesirable. Thus, I do not discuss wheth­
er Jefferson’s mechanism is practical in its 
original form, since I argue it is a norma­
tively flawed mechanism regardless of its 
practicality. For the discussion regarding 
the practicality of the original model see 
Otsuka 2003: 139-141; Muniz-Fraticelli 
2009: 386-391.
9 Otsuka 2003: 90.
10 Otsuka 2003: 147.
11 For a detailed review of different kinds 
of consent, see Simmons 1979: 75-100.
12 Locke 1988: 347-349; Simmons 1979: 
83-84.
13 Otsuka 2003: 91.
14 According to Simmons, Locke also as­
serts that one cannot give even express con­
sent to be governed by a tyrant or by an 
arbitrary government. Locke, in Simmons’s 
interpretation, suggests that tacit consent 
could be given only to states which are 
established on the basis of some kind of a 
social contract and which do not violate the 
law of nature. According to such interpreta­
tion, residence, property ownership etc. are 
mere signs of consent, but are by themselves 
insufficient to establish it. In contrast, Ot- 
suka argues that for Locke, giving consent 
to tyranny or arbitrary power is impossible, 
and therefore does not demonstrate that 
tacit consent is insufficient for subjection 
to legitimate political authority. According 
to Otsuka, tacit consent by residence “is a 
sufficient condition of subjection to legiti­
mate political authority for as long as one 
owns land and resides or moves within the 
governed territory.” My focus is not on in­
terpreting Locke’s argument, but rather on 
the possibility of solving the lost generation 
problem by referring to tacit consent. For 
this end, interpretational debates are irrel­
evant. See Otsuka 2003: 90-91 fn. 8; Sim­
mons 1979: 83-95; Locke 1988: 347-349, 
355-356.
15 Otsuka 2003: 91-92.
16 In the real world people do not “consent” 
to a political authority by residing within its 
borders. There could be a number of rea­
sons for that, such as poverty, oppression, 
and lack of knowledge about other ways of 
life or alternative political institutions. In 
sum, people do not voluntarily choose to 
live where they do.
17 Otsuka 2003: 105-109; Otsuka 2006: 
332.
18 Enoch 2006: 317-318; Otsuka 2003: 
109-110, 149.
19 Otsuka 2003: 137.
20 Enoch, 2006: 318-319.
21 Otsuka, 2006: 334.
22 Otsuka is not alone in rejecting the 
idea of a tacit-consent-based solution un­
der contemporary real world conditions. 
Jefferson himself rejected such a solution 
in reply to Madison’s suggestion to base 
the constitution’s legitimacy on tacit con­
sent via non-repeal. Madison argued the 
following: “I can find no relief from such 
embarrassment but in the received doctrine 
that a tacit assent may be given to estab­
lished governments and laws, and that this 
assent is be inferred from the omission of 
an express revocation” (see Madison 1904: 
440 fn.). In effect, Madison maintains that 
if the living have the opportunity to repeal 
laws using a simple majority, then the fact 
that their elected representatives choose not 
to repeal a law is a sign of tacit consent of 
the whole population that the law is legit­
imate. Thus laws could retain their legiti­
macy via non-repeal by the living majority, 
and therefore there is no need to re-enact 
the constitution. As shown by Otsuka, Jef­
ferson provided two responses to Madison’s 
answer. First, for practical reasons, without 
a formal process of re-enactment people 
will find it harder to change or repeal exist­
ing laws: it is hard to assemble; people are 
not involved in politics; personal interests 
might lead representatives to act against the 
people’s will, and so on. Second, Jefferson 
makes a substantive comparison between 
being governed by the dead and being gov­
erned by another state. Such comparison 
has force if we think of the following exam­
ple. A foreign country declares that its laws 
apply to the United States. The fact that 
this foreign country provides American cit­
izens with the opportunity to repeal its laws 
using majority vote does not eradicate the 
Americans’ view whereby these laws have 
no authority over them. I do not elaborate 
on Madison’s suggestion any further, since
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the focus of this paper is Jefferson’s model 
and not the objections of his adversary. For 
the full discussion between Jefferson and 
Madison and for Otsuka’s interpretation 
see Jefferson 1984; Madison 1904; Otsuka 
2003: 132-136.
23 I do not argue that Otsuka’s consent- 
based account is flawless. I use it only to 
press the problematic issues in Jefferson’s 
account. Enoch, Harel and Muniz-Fraticelli 
all highlighted problems with Otsuka’s ac­
count and raised objections to it which are 
beyond the scope of this paper. For the dis­
cussion regarding Otsuka’s consent-based 
account see Enoch 2006; Harel 2006; 
Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 391-395; Otsuka 
2006: 330-336.
24 One might argue that there is an action 
which is performed only by the lost gen­
eration and from which we can infer tacit 
consent. If we can indeed infer tacit consent 
from such an action in a non-ideal world, 
then it could serve as a solution for the lost 
generation problem. However, since the lost 
generation consists of a cross section of the 
population, I doubt such an action exists.
25 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 391-392; Sim­
mons 1979: 80.
26 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 391-392.
27 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 392.
28 Such a position regarding political legit­
imacy has been embraced by many, most 
famously by Rawls in his “public reason” 
argument. Some, like Muniz-Fraticelli and 
Enoch, claimed that in hypothetical con­
sent accounts, consent does not have much 
of a normative force, and that it is not what 
really matters for legitimacy, but rather the 
objective conditions in which the consent 
hypothetically should be given. There­
fore, they argue, the objective conditions 
these theories argue for (e.g. the condi­
tions that make it reasonable to consent to 
political authority) should be at the heart 
of such theories, not the consent itself. 
Thus one could argue that hypothetical 
consent-based arguments in general can­
not serve consent theorists like Jefferson. 
Although one should bear such possibility 
in mind, the debate about the validity of 
consent theories in general and of hypothet­
ical consent theories in particular is beyond 
the scope of this paper. My narrow claim is 
that even if hypothetical consent views were 
viable, they would not be able to justify 
implementing Jefferson’s mechanism. For 
the full discussion see Enoch 2006: 322; 
Enoch 2015: 126-130; Muniz-Fraticelli 
2009: 392-395; Rawls 2005: 48-54.
29 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 386-391.
30 Otsuka 2003: 140-141.
31 Both the UK and Israel are countries 
without written constitutions. Rather, their 
political systems are framed by constitu­
tional statues which have the same legal sta­
tus. That is of no significance to the point 
I am trying to make; namely that the fact 
their basic laws are easily alterable -  requir­
ing nothing more than a simple majority 
vote in Parliament -  has not led to a state 
of instability.
32 Otsuka 2003: 140.
33 Albeit relatively negligible: four years of 
lost generation according to consent-based 
theories are still four years of unjustified 
coercion.
34 Otsuka 2006: 333.
35 According to Otsuka, even though he 
believes that the right not to be governed 
without consent is not absolute, he does 
clearly state that in order to override such 
a right, the circumstances need to be cat­
astrophic. Therefore Otsuka could argue 
that even in the four-year version of the 
Jeffersonian model, the probable instability 
that would emerge is insufficient to reject 
Jefferson’s model, assuming it legitimises 
the state’s authority for all. However, as 
mentioned, even the four-year version of 
the model still suffers from the “lost genera­
tion” objection, and thus Otsuka would re­
ject it on that basis alone. I have elaborated 
on the possibility of shortening the length 
of the intervals, in order to press the issue 
that even if shorter versions seem intuitively 
more plausible, they suffer from practical 
deficiencies that render them undesirable, 
and thus the response fails. For Otsuka’s 
statement regarding the non-absoluteness 
of the right to be legitimately governed, see 
Otsuka 2006: 333.
36 Green 1988: 161; Simmons 1979: 57.
37 For Christiano’s and Estlund’s full ac­
counts of democratic legitimate authority, 
see Estlund 2008; Christiano 2008.
38 Such a response could also be applied 
to the lost generation objection. However, 
I have decided to place it here because it is 
more directly related to the “majority con­
sent” objection. That is because its focus is 
the attempt to explain why Jefferson has not 
taken into account the legitimacy of major­
ity vote as the normative watershed of po­
litical legitimacy. In any case, this response 
fails with regard to both objections in the 
same way.
39 Jefferson 1984: 959.
40 Which after the establishment of the
state of Israel have become to be what is 
known today as the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF).
41 The fact that we cannot infer consent 
from those who do not vote does not mean 
that the non-voters necessarily do not give 
their consent. It is an epistemic problem. 
Within the scope of logically plausible 
possibilities, it is tenable to claim that all of 
the non-voters do consent to be governed by 
the state. However, it is extremely unlikely. 
Furthermore, tacit-consent-based solu­
tions purport to solve this exact epistemic 
problem by providing a mechanism to infer 
consent. If we cannot infer consent from 
some, then the solution fails. When we do 
not know whether someone gave their con­
sent, we are obliged to get this information 
before governing them illegitimately.
42 Simmons 1979: 73.
43 Simmons 1979: 73.
44 If one succeeds in arguing otherwise, 
i.e. that unanimous consent is likely to be 
achieved, then it might be a good response 
to the majority consent objection, but re­
call that the “lost generation” objection still 
holds.
45 Otsuka 2003: 147.
46 I personally cannot imagine how a mod­
ern state could function where a whole gen­
eration is allowed not to follow the state’s 
rules for a significant amount of time, up 
to 19 years, in addition to those who did 
not give their consent to the regime (es­
pecially when those who do not give their 
consent will sometimes have an interest to 
act against the state and the citizens who 
support it). If there is a plausible way to 
establish a state in which so many people 
do not follow the laws (without the state 
becoming an anarchy), then it is a plausible 
way to vindicate Jefferson’s proposal.
47 Otsuka 2003: 146.
48 Muniz-Fraticelli 2009: 389-91.
49 Simmons 1979: 73 (footnote m).
50 Locke 1988: 98.
51 Nozick 1974: 26-33.
52 Although equally illegitimate, the Jeffer­
sonian model should be implemented even 
under this strict framework under certain 
assumptions, but not for reasons of legiti­
macy. Imagine a scenario where you know 
that P1 and P2 are persons who are going 
to be murdered. One can only save P1. P2 
will be murdered either way. In such a case, 
most would agree that one has an obligation 
to save P1, even though P2’s rights would 
still be violated. Similarly, one can argue 
that implementing the Jeffersonian model,
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or in other words choosing state B, is just 
like saving P1. That is if one is assuming 
the following: (1) Anarchy is not an op­
tion. (2) There is no better mechanism than 
Jefferson’s that can ensure the state’s con­
sent-based legitimacy, and thus necessarily 
there will be people whose right to be legit­
imately governed will be infringed (i.e. the 
non-voters and generation Y). (3) Otsuka 
is right and Muniz-Fraticelli is wrong, and 
thus the Jeffersonian model would allow for 
stability. Under such assumptions, we have 
an obligation to respect the rights of those 
who voted in favour of the state’s authority 
from generations X and Z, as we have the 
right to save P1, since generation Y’s and 
the non-voters’ rights will be infringed ei­
ther way. In such a case, the Jeffersonian 
state would still be illegitimate in a strict 
Lockean sense, but it should be implement­
ed in modern states because it would pre­
vent the unnecessary infringement of the 
rights of generations X and Z.
53 Nozick 1974: 29-30.
54 Otsuka’s left libertarianism rejects util­
itarianism of rights, so I do not believe he 
would support such justification for imple­
menting Jefferson’s model.
55 There are, as I show in footnote 52, oth­
er reasons to implement the Jeffersonian 
model. Thus implementing it is still rele­
vant, but not for the reason of legitimising 
modern states.
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